Lex Naturalis and Jus Naturale by Pennington, Kenneth
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
CUA Law Scholarship Repository 
Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions Faculty Scholarship 
2008 
Lex Naturalis and Jus Naturale 
Kenneth Pennington 
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar 
 Part of the Legal History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kenneth Pennington, Lex Naturalis and Jus Naturale, 68 JURIST: STUD. CHURCH L. & MINISTRY 569 
(2008). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions by an authorized 
administrator of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
THE JURIST 68 (2008) 569-591
LEX NATURALIS AND IUS NATURALE
KENNETH PENNINGTON
After the air attacks of September 11, 2001 the United States govern-
ment decided to fortify all public government buildings and spaces of
importance in Washington, D.C. that might be targets of future attacks.
The expenditures for these projects ran to millions of dollars and in-
cluded the White House, Congress, and the Supreme Court. These ex-
tensive fortifications were inspired by widespread fear at all levels of the
American government that extreme measures were needed to protect
themselves and government buildings. This culture of fear quickly be-
came an accepted part of American political discourse. Fear was no
longer cowardly; it became a badge of courage. Streets around govern-
ment buildings were closed. Streets that remained open were provided
with retractable barriers. A security cordon around the White House was
greatly expanded. The public was denied entrance to the grand staircase
on the West side of the Capitol buildings. Armed police were placed on
every corner of Capitol Hill twenty-four hours a day. To secure perime-
ters metal bollards were placed around buildings and public spaces at a
cost of $10,000 each. They could not protect against air attacks or suicide
bombers--only truck and car bombs-but that fact did not deter the
frenzy of construction that still continues. Thousands of bollards were
put in place. The directors of every government agency stumbled over
one another to arrange that their spaces be surrounded by these symbols
of fear. The question that every director in Washington must have asked
themselves again and again was "How could their buildings be bereft of
these symbols that made a public statement of their importance?" Even
the coal burning steam plant on Capitol Hill-the worst source of pollu-
tion in Washington-was fortified.' The bollards around the Supreme
Court were the only ones decorated with a Latin word: Lex. Why did the
judges choose lex and not ius for those protective fences?
To answer that question we have to go back to the Renaissance of law
in the twelfth century. lus and lex were terms of Roman law. The first ju-
rist to examine lex and ius in detail was named Gratian who taught canon
law in Bologna. In the first half of the twelfth century he compiled a
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Tractatus de legibus with which he introduced his students to law. He ex-
plored the different meanings of ius and lex for the first time in European
jurisprudence. Gratian began his Tractatus with a statement that would
remain a standard statement for centuries:2
The Human Race is ruled by two things: namely, natural ius and
mos. The ius of nature is what is contained in the lex and the
Gospel. By it, each person is commanded to do to others what he
wants done to himself and is prohibited from inflicting on others
what he does not want done to himself. This indeed is the lex and
the prophets.
Gratian recognized two major elements of human law: ius and mos. He
connected ius with natural law and lex with the Old and New Testaments.
Human lex did not enter into his discussion-yet. To understand Grat-
ian's awkward introduction one must remember that legislative institu-
tions were just beginning to appear in twelfth century society; custom
regulated society not leges. If Gratian had written his introduction a cen-
tury later he very likely might have written: "Humanum genus duobus re-
gitur, naturali uidelicet et positivo iure."'3 But the canonists had not yet in-
vented the term "ius positivum." To define "ius naturae" he relied on
Matthew 7:12. lus commands each person to render onto others what
each person would want others to render onto her-the Golden Rule.
Gratian patterned his thought after texts that he found in Justinian's Di-
gest. There he found a statement by the ancient jurist Gaius who also de-
fined the law that governed human society: 4
All peoples who are ruled by lex and mos partly use their own ius
and partly the ius that is common to all men. The ius that each na-
2 Gratian, Decretum, ed. Emil Friedberg (Leipzig: B. Tauchnitz, 1879, repr. Graz:
Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1959), D. I d.a.c. 1: "Humanum genus duobus re-
gitur, naturali uidelicet iure et moribus. lus naturae est, quod in lege et euangelio contine-
tur, quo quisque iubetur alii facere, quod sibi uult fieri, et prohibetur alii inferre, quod sibi
nolit fieri. Unde Christus in euangelio: 'Omnia quecunque uultis ut faciant uobis homines,
et uos eadem facite illis. Haec est enim lex et prophetae.' [Matthew 7:12, cf. Luke 6:31]"
3 Stephan Kuttner, "Sur les origines du terme 'droit positif'," Revue historique du
droitfranrais et etranger 15 (1936) 728-740. See also John Marenbon, "Abelard's Con-
cept of Natural Law," Mensch und Natur im Mittelalter, ed. A. Zimmermann and A. Speer
(Miscellanea Mediaevalia 21; Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991) 609-621.
4 Justinian's Digest, ed. Alan Watson (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1985) 1.1.9 "Gaius I inst. Omnes populi, qui legibus et moribus reguntur, partim
suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum iure utuntur. Nam quod quisque populus
ipse sibi ius constituit, id ipsius proprium civitatis est vocaturque ius civile, quasi ius pro-
prium ipsius civitatis: quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud
omnes peraeque custoditur vocaturque ius gentium, quasi quo iure omnes gentes utuntur."
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tion has constituted for itself for each city is called the ius civile;
almost as if it were a ius proprium of that city. What, however,
the natural reason of men establish and is used by all men
equally, is called the ius gentium, almost as if all human beings
use that ius.
Gaius began with lex but quickly switched his terminology to ius. lus can
be common to all men, but ius also governs each city. This iusproprium
is also called ius civile. The ius gentium that is common to all men is es-
tablished by human reason. Gaius' statement is followed by a excerpt
from Ulpian, which was the Roman version of the Golden Rule and gives
another meaning to ius:5 "Justice is the constant and perpetual will of
giving everyone their ius." Ulpian implicitly pointed out that ius also
means right and that justice can be defined by rendering everyone their
proper rights. He continued by observing that there were three precepts
of ius, to live honestly, to not injure other people, and to render everyone
their ius.6 The Roman jurist Paul discussed the equivocal meanings of ius
immediately after Ulpian's text:
7
The term "ius" can be used in several ways. In one way "ius"
means what is always equitable and good, as "lus naturale". In
another way what is in the interest of all or of many in a state
(civitas), such as the "lus civile"... Yet another meaning of "ius"
is to describe the place in which "ius" is vindicated, the name
having been given by him who renders "ius" on the place where
he does it. We can know where that place is by wherever the prae-
tor decides to exercise his jurisdiction, preserving the majesty of
his authority and respecting the 'mos" of our ancestors. That
place is correctly called "ius."
Paul's definition is interesting for two reasons. First, he gave ius a mean-
ing that connects it with equity and equity's handmaiden justice. Second,
5 Dig.l. 1.10pr.: "Ulpianus I reg. lustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum
cuique tribuendi."
6 Dig.l.l.10.1: "Ulpianus I reg. luris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum
non laedere, suum cuique tribuere."
7 Dig.l.1. 11: "Paulus 14 ad sab. lus pluribus modis dicitur: uno modo, cum id quod
semper aequum ac bonum est ius dicitur, ut est ius naturale. altero modo, quod omnibus
aut pluribus in quaque civitate utile est, ut est ius civile ... Alia significatione ius dicitur
locus in quo ius redditur, appellatione collata ab eo quod fit in eo ubi fit. Quem locum de-
terminare hoc modo possumus: ubicumque praetor salva maiestate imperii sui salvoque
more maiorum ius dicere constituit, is locus recte ius appellatur."
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he calls upon a very old tradition in Roman law that defined ius as the
place where justice was rendered.8
Gratian and the jurists had these texts of Roman law to draw upon for
their ideas about ius and lex, but Gratian exploited another source,
Isidore of Seville's Etymologies for much of his thinking about the two
terms. Isidore discussed law in book five of his great encyclopedia, but
his ideas about law did not enter into the Western tradition until Gratian.
He incorporated a text of Isidore in which a contrast was drawn between,
ius, mos, and lex:9
Consuetudo is a sort of ius established by mos and recognized as
lex when lex is lacking. It does not matter whether it is confirmed
by writing or by reason, since reason also supports lex. Further-
more, if lex is determined by reason, then lex will be all that rea-
son has already confirmed-all, at least, that is congruent with
religion, consistent with discipline, and helpful for salvation.
Consuetudo is so called because it is in common use.
Custom was related to, ius when grounded in mos and could be recog-
nized as lex when there is no lex. Reason was the fundamental core prin-
ciple of custom and lex. Early glossators on Gratian's Decretum were
careful to point out that custom did not have to be in writing, but lex was
lex because it was written. Gratian underlined the written character of lex
by citing Isidore in the only place in his Tractatus where he offered a de-
finition of lex: Lex is a species of ius; lex is a written constitution. Fifty
years later Huguccio, the greatest canonist of the age, commented: 1 0
Lex commands what is just and prohibits the contrary. Lex is so
named because it binds, or because it is read as writing, or be-
The Law of the Twelve Tables began "In ius vocando" that undoubtedly shaped this
definition of ius.
9 Gratian, D. I c.5: Isidore, Etymologies Book 5 c.3: "Consuetudo autem est ius quod-
dam moribus institutum, quod pro lege suscipitur, cum deficit lex. Nec differt, an scrip-
tura, an ratione consistat, quoniam et legem ratio commendat. Porro si ratione lex constat,
lex erit omne, iam quod ratione constiterit, dumtaxat quod religioni congruat, quod disci-
plinae conueniat, quod saluti proficiat. Vocatur autem consuetudo, quia in communi est
usu."
10 Huguccio (ca. 1190), D.1 c.3 s.v. Lex est constitutio scripta: iustum precipiens et
contrarium prohibens, ut xxiii. q.iiii. Si ecclesia (C.23 q.4 c.42). Lex dicitur quia ligat, uel
quia legatur utpote scripta, uel quia legitime agat dum sui obseruatores remunerat et trans-
gressores plectit et mulctat, ut infra di. iii. Omnis et d.iiii. Facte (D.3 c.4 and D4 c.1).
Summa decretorum, 1: Distinctiones I-XX, ed. Oldfich Pferovsk, (Monumenta iuris
canonici, Series A, 6; CittA del Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 2006) 25.
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cause it legitimately functions by rewarding those who observe it
and punishes those who transgress its rules.
At the end of the twelfth century the Roman jurist Azo expanded on the
meaning of lex in his Summa on Justinian's Codex:" I
Lex is sometimes defined narrowly and sometimes broadly. An
example of a narrow definition is when a statute of the Roman
people is called a lex... A lex is the common opinion of men who
are learned in the law... Lex is broadly defined when it is used
to describe all reasonable statutes. Whence lex is a sacred com-
mand, ordering honesty and prohibiting the contrary. Conse-
quently it is the rule that governs just and unjust people.
It is important to notice that the jurists never attributed the rich penum-
bras' 2 of meanings to lex that they did to ius. Lex was a plebian hod car-
rier of the law; ius was a term rich in resonances. Ius reminded the jurists
constantly of the transcendental significance of a legal system. It existed
not just to establish right and wrong and to punish the wicked. It was the
source of justice, equity, and rights.
The jurists created a penumbra for lex that was concentrated not only
on what was reasonable but also on consent. Gratian was the first jurist in
the European tradition who connected lex and consent. In a famous pas-
sage he declared that leges are established when they are promulgated,
but that they are valid when they are approved by the mos of those who
use the leges. 13 In contrast, from early on, the penumbras of ius were jus-
tice, equity, and the common good. An anonymous jurist in the early
I Azo (ca. 1200-1220), Summa Codicis, De legibus et constitution ibus principis Cod.
1.14, Aschaffenburg Stiftsbibliothek Perg. 15, fol. 4v, (Lyon 1564) fol. 8r: "Lex autem
ponitur quandoque stricte quandoque large, ut cum ponitur stricte pro statuto populi Ro-
mani et lex est hoc quod dicitur ... Lex est commune praeceptum virorum prudentium
consultum... Quandoque ponitur pro rationabili large omni statuto. Vnde et dicitur lex est
sanctio sancta, iubens honesta prohibens contraria. Et ita regula est iustorum et iniusto-
rum, ut dicitur in translatione greci, ut ff. eodem l.ii. (Dig. 1.3.2)."
12 "Penumbra" is a term that has evolved in American constitutional law to mean con-
cepts that are attached to a specific rule or term or norm. Justice William 0. Douglas fa-
mously used the term in this sense in the American Supreme Court decision, Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1965).
13 D.4 d.p.c.3: "Leges instituuntur, cum promulgantur, firmantur, cum moribus uten-
tium approbantur. Sicut enim moribus utentium in contrarium nonnullae leges hodie ab-
rogatae sunt, ita moribus utentium ipsae leges confirmantur."
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twelfth century graphically illustrates this point. In a gloss to Justinian's
Codex he described the relationship between ius and justice: 14
Justice and ius are in effect the same or ought to be the same.
Whatever justice wants, ius strives to follow. It happens that
sometimes... ius is not in concord with justice. When this oc-
curs justice or equity interprets that, if ius openly departs from
equity, we may ignore the authority of ius and follow equity.
Equity and justice belong in the realm of ius; no jurist would have
thought about lex in the same way. This fact is illustrated by the way in
which the jurists talked about the hierarchy of laws. They talked about
ius divinum, ius naturale, and ius gentium. These were not leges; they
were iura.
For the later jurists Ulpian's and Gratian's definition of justice domi-
nated their thought. Justice was the will to respect the ius of others. It was
a platitude in the legal tradition. The platitude led them to consider other
definitions that did not focus on ius. The most prevalent of these was a
definition of justice that focused on a social contract. The idea that jus-
tice must not only be connected with ius/rights but also with the common
good can be traced back to Cicero. Many Christian thinkers followed this
stoical line of thought. 15 However, as we have seen, the ancient Roman
jurists did not connect either justice or ius with the common good. That
changed in the twelfth century. One of the first jurists to write a gloss on
Gratian's introductory definition of law and ius naturale, Paucapalea,
undoubtedly influenced by theological thought, defined as justice Grat-
ian's "each person is commanded to do to others what he wants done to
himself and is prohibited from inflicting on others what he does not want
done to himself." And "justice," he went on, "is the tacit contract of na-
ture discovered to help many people."16 Early glosses to the Decretum
"4 Anonymous Jurist (ca. 1130?), to Cod. 1.13.2 s.v. Que religiosa mente, Paris,
B.N.F. 4517, fol. 18r: (Bottom margin); Vat. lat. 1427, fol. 22r (next to Cod. 1.12.6.6-9):
"Iustitia et ius in effectu idem sunt uel esse deberent. Quid enim iustitia uult, idem et ius
persequi studet. Accidit tamen ut quandoque .... ab ea dissonet. Quod cum fit iustitia ipsa
siue equitas sic interpretatur ut siquid ius ab equitate aperte dissonet eius omissa auctori-
tate equitatem sequamur."
15 Stephan Kuttner, "A Forgotten Definition of Justice," Milanges Girard Fransen
(Studia Gratiana 20; Rome: 1976) 76-110, reprinted in The History ofldeas and Doctrines
of Canon Law in the Middle Ages (London: Variorum, 1980) 76: "habitus animi communi
utilitate conservata, suam cuique tribuens dignitatem," Cicero, De inventione 2.53.160.
16 Paucapalea (ca. 1145-1150), Summa, ed. Johann F. von Schulte (Giessen: E. Roth,
1890) 4: "lustitia est natura tacita conventio in adiutorium multorum inventa." See Kutt-
ner, "A Forgotten Definition of Justice," 80.
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repeated Paucapalea's connection of ius naturale and justice. 17 Abelard
seems to have been one of the first theologians to make the connection
between justice and the common good. Referring to the theological and
the legal traditions, he declared: 1
8
The philosophers define justice as the "habitus" of the mind to
render to every person what is his as long as the common good is
preserved.' 9 Justinian defined this concept in his definition when
he would say, "Justice is the constant and perpetual will,"etc.
"His" can refer to the receiver as well as to the giver. If it refers
to the receiver then <this right> ought to be regulated by the
preservation of the common good. Justice refers to the common
good in all matters.
Gratian shaped his first dictum that introduced the Decretum from the
theological and the legal traditions. He made a key connection between
the two that has gone unnoticed. The theological tradition had long con-
nected the Golden Rule with natural law. The juridical tradition did not.
The first person who connected the Golden Rule with natural law was in
a letter that a disciple of Jerome wrote at his death.20 Prosperus of
Aquitaine linked the Golden Rule to natural law in his commentary on
the Psalms. 21 Haimo of Halberstadt (t 853) declared in two sermons and
his biblical commentaries that natural law consisted of two precepts: "Do
17 E.g., Cologne, Dombibl. 128, fol. 1Ov: " lustitia est tacita conuentio nature in adiu-
torum multorum inuenta" in a marginal gloss opposite Gratian's first dictum.
'8 Peter Abelard, Sententie magistri Petri Abaelardi, ed. David Luscombe et al. (Cor-
pus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis 14; Turnhout: Brepols, 2006) 134-135:
"lustitiam uero sic definiunt philosophi: lustitia est habitus animi [om. Bu] reddens
unicuique quod suum est, communi utilitate seruata. Hoc idem lustinianus sua diffinitione
notauit cum diceret sic[sic diceret tr. Bul: lustitia est constans et perpetua uoluntas, etc..
. 'Suum' potest referri tam ad accipientem quam ad tribuentem. Si ad accipientem refer-
atur, tunc determinandum est communi utilitate seruata. lustitie siquidem est omnia ad
communem utilitatem referre." It is not certain that this text is Abelard's. It had been at-
tributed to a certain Hermannus; see Luscombe's introduction to his edition, pp. 10*- 12*.
The text is the same as in PL 178.1750-1751 and Sandro Buzzetti's edition (Bu), Senten-
tie magistri Petri Abelardi (Sententie Hermanni) Pubblicazioni della FacoltA di Lettere e
Filosofia dell'UniversitA di Milano 31; Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1983) 145.
19 See Kuttner, "A Forgotten Definition of Justice" for the lineage of this concept of
justice.
20 PL 22.239-240: "Lex naturalis hoc praecipit: ut quod ab aliis desideramus, hoc aliis
faciamus."
21 PL 51.354, to Psalm 118, verse 119: "sed omnem hominem teneri lege naturae ut
quod pati non vult, sciat alii non esse faciendum."
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onto others.. ." and "What you do not want done to yourself, you should
not do to others (cf. Tobias 4.16). Whatever the law and the prophets will
ordain can be comprehended within these two precepts. ' 22 Remigius
of Auxerre (t 980) rehearsed the tradition in his commentary on Gene-
sis. 23 In the late eleventh and early twelfth century Rupert of Deutz
(t 1129-1130) declared that natural law is written in the hearts of men
and its expression was the Golden Rule. 24 Hugh of St. Victor (t 1141),
whose work Gratian might have known, and Honorius Augustodunensis
(t 1156) repeated the tradition. The Golden Rule was a precept and com-
mand of natural law.25
When Gratian proclaimed at the beginning of his Decretum that nat-
ural law was based on the Lex and the Gospels and that the Golden Rule
was the Lex and the Prophets, he drew upon a long theological tradition.
He also incorporated the two traditional theological definitions of the
Golden Rule: "One should do to others what one would have others do to
you," and "You should not do to others what you should not want done to
you." These two precepts, one positive and the other negative, were very
similar to Ulpian's definition of ius that I quoted earlier.26 Gratian, how-
ever, combined the Roman law and the theological traditions in a way
that would be of fundamental importance for the future. He combined
22 PL 118.536: "Quaecumque vultis ut faciunt vobis homines, et vos eadem facite
illis." Ista est lex naturalis, quae in duobus consistit praeceptis, et in his duabus sententiis
tota lex pendet et prophetae. Et hoc est unum quod tibi dicitur: "Quaecumque vultis ut
faciunt vobis hominess" et aliud est quod alibi dicitur "Quod tibi non vis fieri, alii ne fe-
ceris." Quia quidquid lex et prophetae latius describunt in his duobus praeceptis breviter
est comprehensum." See also PL 118.237, PL 116.830, PL 116.889, 116.430.
23 PL 131.98, Genesis 24, verse 25: "Rebecca apud se esse dicit lex est naturalis quam
sancta ecclesia antequam ad Christum veniret, habebat, qua dicitur 'Quaecumque vultis ut
faciunt vobis homines, eadem et vos facite illis.' Ergo per hanc legem naturae praepara-
batur ingressus legi evangelicae."
24 Rupert of Deutz, Super Marthaeum PL 168.1407: "Saltem per legem naturalem
quae in cordibus scripta est, quae est hujiusmodi: 'Quod tibi non vis fieri, alii nec feceris'."
Also PL 169.1304 and PL 170.474.
25 Hugh of Saint Victor, De sacramentis, PL 176.38-39: "lex naturalis ... unum tan-
turn praeceptum in corde hominis posuit: 'Quod tibi vis, id aliis feceris; quod tibi non vis,
aliis ne faceris'." PL 175.659-660: "Sub lege naturali duo praecepta fuerunt, tria sacra-
menta. Duo praecepta: 'Quod tibi non vis, alii ne faceris' et 'Quaecumque vultis ut faciunt
vobis homines, eadem et vos facite illis'." Also PL 177.668. Honorius Augustodunensis,
Speculum ecclesiae PL 172.919: 'Homini de pardyso ejecto inditur lex naturalis: 'Quod
tibi non vis, alii ne feceris'." Also PL 172.362.
26 Dig.l.l.10.1: "Ulpianus I reg. luris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum
non laedere, suum cuique tribuere."
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both traditions and named them not "lex naturalis" but "ius naturale." His
change of vocabulary enabled later jurists to incorporate the rich penum-
bras of meaning for ius, which as we have seen, were completely lacking
in the definitions of lex.
Gratian added his Tractatus de legibus to the second recension of his
Decretum. Recently scholars have vigorously debated the chronology of
Gratian's work.27 Some have placed his teaching activity in Bologna to
the 1 140's.28 Others have argued for a much earlier date.29 A letter of
Pope Innocent II provides evidence for Gratian's having taught and com-
piled his Decretum during the 1120's and early 1130's. In the arenga of a
letter written in 1133 to the bishop of Lund, Innocent proclaimed that
"Quemadmodum iuris naturalis est alterum non laedere, ita nimirum
nostri officii laesum adiuvare." 30 As we have seen, the two precepts of
natural law that the theologians embraced over the centuries were "Do
onto others as you would have them do onto you" and "Do not injure oth-
ers." We have also seen that the same two ideas can be found in Justin-
ian's Digest through Ulpian's formulation: "luris praecepta sunt haec:
17 I have reviewed this discussion and the literature in "The Birth of the 'lus com-
mune': King Roger II's Legislation," Rivista internazionale di diritto comune 17 (2006)
23-60 and "'The Big Bang": Roman Law in the Early Twelfth-Century,' Rivista inter-
nazionale di diritto comune 18 (2007).
28 Anders Winroth has given a summary of recent scholarship on Gratian in "Recent
Work on the Making of Gratian's Decretum,"' Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law 26
(2004-2006) 1-29, with a complete bibliography to 2006. See especially Winroth's two
essays defending a later date for the teaching of Roman and canon law, "The Teaching of
Law in the Twelfth Century," in Law and Learning in the Middle Ages, ed. Helle Vogt and
Mia Monster-Swendsen (Copenhagen: DJOF, 2006) 41-62 and "Neither Free nor Slave:
Theology and Law in Gratian's Thoughts on the Definition of Marriage and Unfree Per-
sons," in Medieval Foundations of the Western Legal Tradition: A Tribute to Kenneth Pen-
nington, ed. Mary E. Sommar and Wolfgang P. MUller (Washington, D.C.: Catholic Uni-
versity of America Press, 2006) 97-109.
29 Carlos Larrainzar, "El borrador del la 'Concordia' de Graziano: Sankt Gallen,
Stiftsbibliothek MS 673 (= Sg)," lus ecclesiae: Rivista internazionale di diritto canonico
9 (1999) 593-666. Kenneth Pennington, "Gratian, Causa 19, and the Birth of Canonical
Jurisprudence," La cultura giuridico-canonica medioevale: Premesse per un dialogo ec-
umenico, edd. Enrique de Le6n and Nicolhs Alvarez (Pontificia Universith della Santa
Croce, Monografie Giuridiche 22; Milano 2003) 215-236 and in an expanded version in
"Panta rei": Studi dedicati a Manlio Bellomo, ed. Orazio Condorelli (Roma 2004)
4:339-355. Atria Larson, 'The Evolution of Gratian's Tractatus depenitentia," Bulletin of
Medieval Canon Law 26 (2004-2006) 59-123.
30 Migne, PL 179.182 (JL 7625). First printed by Johann Martin Lappenberg, Ham-
burgisches Urkundenbuch (Vol. 1, Hamburg: Perthes-Besser & Mauke, 1842) 134-135.
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honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere." Conse-
quently, whoever composed Innocent's letter must have known Gratian's
Tractatus de legibus and the Digest, and since no one before Gratian had
attributed the Golden Rule to Ius naturale, Innocent's letter is evidence
that Gratian must have finished his first draft of the Tractatus before
1133. It is also evidence that the teaching of Roman and canon law in
Bologna must have already been in full swing by the late 1120's and
early 1130's.
We have seen that until the twelfth century the theologians always
used the term lex naturalis. In the thirteenth century they gradually began
to incorporate the change from lex naturalis to ius naturale into their
thought. Thomas Aquinas' works demonstrate the slow penetration of
the term ius naturale into theological thought. In his early works, espe-
cially his commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (ca. 1256),
Aquinas discusses natural law in depth but never uses the term ius natu-
rale, only lex naturalis.31 When Thomas Aquinas discussed natural law
in his Summa theologiae (ca. 1265-1272), he vacillated in his terminol-
ogy between ius naturale and lex naturalis32 As far as I can see, he used
the two terms interchangeably, and he never drew upon the rich jurispru-
dential discussions of the meanings of "ius." Other evidence points to
Thomas' having turned to and his becoming familiar with the legal tradi-
tion only in his later works. He cited Gratian's Decretum seven times in
his Commentary on the Sentences and 81 times in his Summa theologiae.
It is not that Thomas was unaware or uninterested in law in his early writ-
ings. He cited papal decretals 32 times in his Commentary on the Sen-
tences. I suspect that Thomas' own Tractatus de legibus forced him to
confront Gratian's Tractatus as he was writing about law in his Summa
theologiae.33
Much of the debate about Aquinas' thought on natural law has focused
on his ideas about rights and whether his theory of natural law was com-
31 Peter Lombard also used only lex naturalis when he discussed natural law. If
Thomas had known Gratian's introductory remarks, he might have connected the Golden
Rule with natural law when he commented on Lombard's Sentences in Book 3 dist. 36-37,
but he did not.
32 According to the word count in the Corpus Thomisticum he used lex naturalis more
than ius naturale.
33 I have gleaned all these statistics here and elsewhere in this paper from the Index
Thomisticum on the web: http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/it/index.age
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patible with the idea of subjective rights.34 Brian Tierney has argued that
Aquinas had no theory of subjective natural rights, although Thomas did
recognize that ius could mean right and that right could be a human "fac-
ultas."35 Aquinas frequently used the term "facultas" to describe a per-
son's right and power to act.36 He only rarely substituted the term ius for
facultas.37 This fact is, I think, some support for Tierney's argument that
Thomas did not normally think of ius as a right or power and did not have
a theory of subjective rights. As Tierney has written for Aquinas "ius was
primarily a thing (rem), something existing in external nature."38
I would like, however, to make a slightly different argument from the
concerns of Tierney, Finnis, and Zuckert. As I have shown, Thomas came
to the concept of ius naturale late, and he never fully grappled with the
full implications of how Gratian and his successors thought of natural
law as a set of precepts and as well as a set of rules or laws. As far as I can
tell, Aquinas did not know the theological tradition that Gratian drew
upon when he attributed the Golden Rule to natural law. He only seems
to have cited the Golden Rule in his later works, the Summa theologiae
and his Commentary on Matthew; and in them Thomas never called it a
precept of natural law. Most importantly I think that Thomas' discussion
of natural law is dominated by his language. For him natural law was lex
naturalis not ius naturale. I believe that his language shaped his thought.
It would go far beyond the scope of this paper to prove conclusively
(or to disprove) the points that I have made in the previous paragraphs.
31 There is a clear presentation of the issues by Brian Tierney, John M. Finnis, and
Michael P. Zuckert in The Review of Politics 64 (2002) 289-420.
35 Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law
and Church Law 1150-1625 (Emory University Studies in Law and Religion 5; Atlanta:
Scholars Press, 1997) 22-27 and passim. Tierney's discussion of Suarez' thought, pp.
301-315, illuminates the difference between later thinkers and Aquinas.
36 Many examples can be found in Thomas' works: Facultas rebellandi, nubendi,
vendendi, implendi, dimittendi, petendi, docendi, praedicandi, peccandi, coeundi, et alia.
The jurists also usedfacultas as an equivalent of ius.
37 Finnis points out several instances in which Thomas used ius instead offacultas; but
these exceptions are so few that they prove the rule that he did not normally associate ius
with the concept of the right or power to do something. See John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral,
Political, and Legal Theory (Founders of Modem Political and Social Thought; Oxford:
Oxford University Press,1998) 134-135. It is not by chance that when Thomas does use
ius it is almost always when he is drawing upon canonistic thought (marriage, tithes, prop-
erty). On the other hand, Finnis makes a point in these pages with which I am in full agree-
ment: Thomas did not distinguish between lex and ius and used the terms interchangeably.
18 Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights 23.
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All of Thomas' use of lex naturalis and ius naturale would have to be ex-
amined and compared in contextual and chronological order. For pur-
poses of the argument in this paper let me here just give a couple of ex-
amples of Thomas' discussion of ius naturale when he defined the term
in question 94.
Thomas confronted natural law and Gratian's definition of natural law
directly in his Tractatus de legibus.39 He began question 94 by discussing
naturalis lex as a habitus. He had already connected habitus to lex natu-
ralis in his Commentary on the Sentences.4" In doing so Thomas drew
upon recent theological thinking about natural law. As we have seen,
since Cicero, justice had been described as a habitus in theology and law,
but natural law was never connected with habitus until the thirteenth cen-
tury. Alexander of Hales and Albertus Magnus had connected lex natu-
ralis with habitus, and Thomas shaped his definition of lex naturalis
around their opinions. 4 1
Gratian's definition of ius naturale did not fit into Thomas' scheme of
definitions. But it was such a well-known text by the time Thomas wrote
that he had to deal with it. He sidled up to Gratian belatedly when he
asked whether the lex naturae was the same for all human beings in arti-
cle 4 of question 94 and quoted Gratian's statement that ius naturale is
what is contained in the Old and New Testaments. But since, he noted,
these Judeo-Christian texts are not accepted by everyone, lex naturalis is
not common to all people. 42 He put forward several counter arguments,
including the text of Isidore of Seville that Gratian included at Distinc-
39 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1-2, q.94 a.
40 Thomas Aquinas, Super Sententiis, lib. 2 d.24 q.2 4 arg. 5: "Praeterea, Damascenus
dicit, quod conscientia est lex intellectus nostri. Sed lex intellectus est ipsa lex naturalis,
quae est habitus principiorum iuris. Ergo videtur quod conscientia sit habitus, et non
actus." Super Sent., lib. 2 d.24 q.2 4: "Quandoque vero dicitur habitus, quo quis disponi-
tur ad consciendum; et secundum hoc ipsa lex naturalis et habitus rationis consuevit dici
conscientia. Quidam etiam dicunt, quod conscientia quandoque potentiam nominat; sed
hoc nimis extraneum est, et improprie dictum: quod patet, si diligenter omnes potentiae
animae inspiciantur."
4" See Michael Bertram Crowe, The Changing Profile of the Natural Law (The Hague:
Nijhoff, 1977) 157 and more generally his discussion on pp. 136-166.
42 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1-2, q. 94 a. 4 arg. 1: "Ad quartum sic proce-
ditur. Videtur quod lex naturae non sit una apud omnes. Dicitur enim in decretis, dist. I,
quod ius naturale est quod in lege et in Evangelio continetur. Sed hoc non est commune
omnibus, quia, ut dicitur Rom. X, non omnes obediunt Evangelio. Ergo lex naturalis non
est una apud omnes."
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tion 1, canon 7.43 In this text, the most important one on natural law in
Gratian's Decretum, Isidore had declared that ius naturale was common
to all nations. The canonists quickly glossed "nations" as all persons who
had been born, "nascentium."' Natural law was common to all human
beings.
Thomas resolved the contradiction that he had posed by relying on
Aristotle not the jurists. Those rules to which people are "naturally" in-
clined through reason pertain to natural law.45 He was not comfortable-
or perhaps it is more accurate to say-or sympathetic with Gratian's ap-
proach to natural law. The entire text of Isidore that Gratian included in
his discussion of natural law listed a series of precepts to illustrate his as-
sertion that natural law was based on the Golden Rule:46
Natural law is common to all nations. It has its origins in nature
not in any constitution. Examples of natural law are the union of
men and women, the procreation and raising of children, the
common possessions of all persons, the equal liberty of all per-
sons, the acquisition of things that are taken from the heavens,
earth, or sea, the return of property or money that has been de-
posited or entrusted. This also includes the right to repel violence
with force. These things and similar are never unjust but are nat-
ural and equitable.
41 Ibid. 1-2 q. 94 a. 4 s. c: "Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., ius na-
turale est commune omnium nationum." Editors and translators cite this text as coming
from Isidore's Etymologies (which it does), but Thomas took it from Gratian.
I The earliest gloss that I know is an interlinear gloss in K61n, Dombibl. 127, fol. 9r:
D. I c.7 s.v. nationum "idest nascentium." The idea became mainstream when Huguccio
glossed the text, s.v. omnium nationum: "idest omnium nascentium, idest animalium."
Summa decretorum, 1: Distinctiones I-XX, ed. Oldfich PferovskS (Monumenta iuris
canonici, Series A, 6; Citti del Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 2006) 31.
15 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1-2 q. 94 a. 4 co. "Respondeo dicendum quod,
sicut supra dictum est, ad legem naturae pertinent ea ad quae homo naturaliter inclinatur;
inter quae homini proprium est ut inclinetur ad agendum secundum rationem. Ad rationem
autem pertinet ex communibus ad propria procedere, ut patet ex I Physic."
46 Gratian, Decretum D. I c.7: "lus naturale est commune omnium nationum, eo quod
ubique instinctu nature, non constitutione aliqua habetur, ut viri et femine conjunctio,
liberorum successio et educatio, communis omnium possessio et omnium una libertas, ac-
quisitio eorum, quae celo, terra marique capiuntur; item deposite rei vel commendate pe-
cuniae restitutio, violentie per vim repulsio. Nam hoc, aut si quid huic simile est, nunquam
injustum, sed naturale equumque habetur."
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Isidore/Gratian's list of precepts were not leges. The list is a set of
human relationships having their origins in nature (instinctu naturae).
All of these relationships are encompassed by rights and duties. Men and
women have the right and the duty to mate. Men and women have the
right and the duty to raise children. Children have the right to be raised,
and the duty to honor their parents.47 Isidore/Gratian turned to Roman
law to describe other precepts. People have the right to claim ownership
of "res nullius" and the right of self defense.
Thomas, however, stumbled when he confronted "the return of prop-
erty or money that has been deposited or entrusted" in Gratian/Isidore's
text. Modern readers have not always understood that Thomas was read-
ing Isidore in Gratian and not Isidore divorced from its place in the De-
cretum. Thomas almost certainly understood that returning a deposit was
a common norm of natural law because it was in accord with reason. This
idea had a long tradition. Thomas always emphasized that reason was
central to natural law norms. However, he must have asked himself, how
could the Roman law contract of deposit and commodatum be a general
norm of natural law? After all, there were exceptions. Thomas did not un-
derstand that Gratian expected Isidore's text to be interpreted through the
prism of his opening statement on natural law. Instead Thomas ap-
proached the text literally. Is it a norm of natural law that a gratuitous
contract of deposit or commodatum should always be fulfilled?48 The ob-
vious answer to his literal question is no: 4 9
47 This right and duty were already embedded in Roman testamentary law. Children
could not be disinherited unless they committed certain serious crimes. Later the canon-
ists developed the right of children to be nurtured and supported; on both issues see
Charles J. Reid, Jr. Power over the Body, Equality in the Family: Rights and Domestic Re-
lations in Medieval Canon Law (Emory University Studies in Law and Religion. Grand
Rapids, Michigan-Cambridge: William B. Eerdmanns Publishing Company, 2004) 82-93
and 165-205 and passim. For the English common law context, see Richard Helmholz,
The Canon Law and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction from 597 to the 1640s (The Oxford Histo-
ry of the Laws of England, 1; Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) 244, 256,
377,425-426, 560-561.
18 On the Roman law of deposit, see Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations:
Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)
205-220.
49 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1-2 q. 94 a. 4 co. "Apud omnes enim hoc rec-
tum est et verum, ut secundum rationem agatur. Ex hoc autem principio sequitur quasi
conclusio propria, quod deposita sint reddenda. Et hoc quidem ut in pluribus verum est,
sed potest in aliquo casu contingere quod sit damnosum, et per consequens irrationabile,
si deposita reddantur; puta si aliquis petat ad impugnandam patriam. Et hoc tanto magis
invenitur deficere, quanto magis ad particularia descenditur, puta si dicatur quod deposita
LEX NATURALIS AND IUS NATURALE
It is right and true that all things should be done according to rea-
son. From this principle it follows as an almost inevitable con-
clusion that deposits must be returned. And indeed this is true in
many cases. But it can happen that in a case it might be damag-
ing and consequently would be irrational if a deposit was re-
turned. For example if someone would use the deposit to wage
war against his homeland. <Reason> can be deficient as one de-
scends into particular cases. Consider if it were said that deposits
must be returned with a stipulation or in another manner with
particular conditions attached. In that case the many more rea-
sons can arise that would make it not right to either return or keep
the deposit.
Thomas' loses his grip on the legal rules governing the contract of de-
posit at the end. "Cautiones" or "conditiones" could not be attached to
the deposit because the contracts of deposit and commodatum would
then lose their unilateral and gratuitous nature. Nonetheless, it is clear;
and that is the main point, Thomas thought of this section of Grat-
ian/Isidore's text more as a "lex"-that is the rules of positive Roman law
governing these contracts than as Gratian meant it to be: an example of
the precept "ius suum cuique tribuere" He also misunderstood the rules
that regulated gratuitous contracts. However, Gratian certainly and
Isidore possibly were thinking of deposit and commodatum as the mani-
festation of the foundational precept of ius naturale in this area of law:
do unto others as others would do unto you. The depositor or lender had
to depend on the depositary's or borrower's honor to return the property.
The exceptions that Thomas proposed would not have posed difficulties
for Gratian or Isidore. If returning a deposit resulted in harm to others or
to herself, then it should not be returned. No other contracts would have
fallen into this category. Consequently, the Golden Rule had great moral
and ethical force in gratuitous contracts and not in others that had con-
sideration (do ut des) and conditions attached to them. That is why
Gratian and Isidore chose these contracts for their illustration of a funda-
mental precept of natural law. Thomas analyzed the contract of deposi-
turn and commodatum in positivistic terms. His first argument would
have been persuasive to Gratian and the jurists: if the return of the prop-
sunt reddenda cum tali cautione, vel tali modo, quanto enim plures conditiones particu-
lares apponuntur, tanto pluribus modis poterit deficere, ut non sit rectum vel in reddendo
vel in non reddendo."
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erty resulted in damage to the common good and was unreasonable, it
should not be returned. Gratian and Isidore, however, were propounding
a much larger precept that Thomas just did not see.
The jurists, however, understood Gratian's point. If Thomas had read
Huguccio's gloss on Isidore's text, he might have seen gratuitous con-
tracts in a different light. Huguccio made Gratian's point exactly in his
gloss to Isidore's text at the end of the twelfth century:50
"The return of property or money that has been deposited or en-
trusted": This by right (ius) or evangelical command, in which
anyone is ordered to do unto others what he wishes to be done to
him, and anyone is prohibited from doing unto others what she
would not wish to be done to her. Reason and the judgment of
reason approves restitution that was deposited with me or was
entrusted to me.
Huguccio and the canonists saw that Gratian was using Isidore to give an
illustration of a precept. He was not claiming that the Roman contracts of
deposit and commodatum were in some sense an absolute principle of
natural law. Rather, they were an illustration of a precept of natural law.
Thomas did not see the connection. This is not surprising. Thomas was
not a jurist. He did not understand the intricacies of juristic thought. As
we have seen, he came to Gratian's doctrine of natural law late in his ca-
reer; and there is little evidence in his work that he knew more about ju-
risprudence in general and natural law in particular than he found in Gra-
tian's Decretum. 51
When Thomas came back to Gratian at the end of article 4 of question
94, he returned to the question of whether all law contained in the Old
and New Testament constituted natural law. The question that he posed
in the beginning of the question is, to a certain extent, specious. No jurist
or theologian ever claimed that all the precepts in the Judeo-Christian
texts were tenets of natural law. Thomas conceded that he had con-
50 Huguccio, Summa decretorum, ed. Pferovsk', D. 1 .c.7, s.v. item deposite: "Hoc de
iure uel precepto euangelico, quo quis iubetur alii facere quod sibi uult fieri et prohibetur
alii facere quod sibi non uult fieri. Ratio etiam et iudicium rationis approbat id restituen-
dum fore quod apud me est depositum uel michi est commodatum."
11 I speak narrowly about his understanding of natural law jurisprudence. As I have in-
dicated earlier, Thomas cited Gratian and the decretals frequently in his works.
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structed a straw man that did not reflect Gratian's text accurately. He
concluded: 52
It must be said to the original question that Gratian's comment
ought not be understood that almost all law contained in the Old
and New Testament are laws of nature, since many things there
are "above nature." 53 But whatever constitutes natural law is
fully contained there. Consequently Gratian said immediately, as
an example and as a clarification, "The ius of nature is what is
contained in the lex and the Gospel. By it, each person is com-
manded to do to others what she wants done to herself."
Thomas' summary of Gratian's meaning is correct. What he did not un-
derstand is how Gratian's conception of natural law as a precept that
could be expressed by the Golden Rule of the Judeo-Christian and
Roman legal traditions and how it was linked with Isidore of Seville's
text in D. 1 c.7.
Thomas may not have understood Gratian, but his commentary on nat-
ural law in his Summa theologiae became a touchstone for all later dis-
cussions in theology and law. In part this was because the later canonists
did not write commentaries on Gratian's Decretum and his Tractatus de
legibus. Consequently, the jurists had to turn to Thomas and the theolog-
ical tradition. The only commentary on Gratian that circulated widely in
the later Middle Ages was Guido de Baysio's Rosarium that he finished
around 1300. Guido was, as far as we know, the first canonist to use
Thomas' commentary on natural law.54
Nicholaus de Tudeschis (Panormitanus) wrote one of the only detailed
commentaries on the first few chapters of Gratian's Tractatus de legibus
in the late Middle Ages. He dealt with Thomas and Gratian in his discus-
sion of natural law.55 Although his extensive commentary seems not to
52 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1-2 q. 94 a. 4 ad I "Ad primum ergo dicendum
quod verbum illud non est sic intelligendum quasi omnia quae in lege et in Evangelio con-
tinentur, sint de lege naturae, cum multa tradantur ibi supra naturam, sed quia ea quae sunt
de lege naturae, plenarie ibi traduntur. Unde cum dixisset Gratianus quod ius naturale est
quod in lege et in Evangelio continetur, statim, exemplificando, subiunxit, quo quisque iu-
betur alii facere quod sibi vult fieri."
53 I am not sure I understand what Thomas means by "supra naturam."
5' Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights 27.
55 Orazio Condorelli, "La dottrina delle fonti del diritto nel Commentario del Panor-
mitano sulla Distinctio prima del Decretum," Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftungfir Rechts
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have circulated widely and was not generally known, it is a good exam-
ple how important Thomas' discussion of natural law had become by the
middle of the fifteenth century.
At the beginning of his commentary Panormitanus quoted Thomas'
definition of natural law that had become lapidary: "natural law (lex nat-
uralis) is nothing other than the impression of divine illumination on us.
Consequently, lex naturalis is every rational creature's participation in
the lex eternal. '56 He expanded upon Thomas' definition using his lan-
guage and terminology. In spite of the legal tradition that eschewed the
term lex naturalis, Panormitanus repeatedly adopted Thomas' terminol-
ogy.57 Thomas had stated that the first principle of law and therefore of
geschichte, Kanonistische Abteilung 91 (2005) 299-354; his Commentary was discovered
by Antony Black; see Kenneth Pennington, "Nicholaus de Tudeschis (Panormitanus),"
Niccolb Tedeschi (Abbas Panormitanus) e i suoi Commentaria in Decretales, ed. Orazio
Condorelli (Rome: I1 Cigno, 2000) 9-36, on p. 16. Also published on CD Rom with Panor-
mitanus' Commentary: Nicholaus de Tudeschis (Abbas Panornitanus) Commentaria in
Decretales Gregorii IX et in Clementinas Epistolas (Edizioni Informatiche, Rome: I1
Cigno, 2000).
56 Panormitanus, Lucca, Biblioteca Capitolare Feliniana, 160, fol. 253rb, D. I c. I
(Omnes leges): "Nota ex isto textu quod omnes leges distinguuntur in duas species dum-
taxat, aut enim sunt divine aut humane. Et nota quod divine constant natura, humane vero
moribus. Ex quibus infero ad duo. Et primo quod lex naturalis potest dici divina: non enim
humana, ergo divina. Et quod dici posset divina patet per illud verbum 'natura'. Hinc dicit
beatus Thomas in prima secunde q. xcia articulo ii. (1-2 q.91 a.2) quod naturalis lex nihil
aliud est quam impressio divini luminis in nobis, unde secundum eundem lex naturalis est
participatio legis eterne in rationali creatura." Condorelli prints the excerpts from Panor-
mitanus' text that I have used (with a few of my own additions from the Lucca manuscript)
in his essay "La dottrina."
17 Ibid. fol. 253rb-253va: "Ego tamen puto quod lex naturalis non proprie comprehen-
datur sub lege divina, licet participet de lege etema, que est summa ratio in Deo existens,
ut notat beatus Thomas in prima secunde q. xci. ar. i. (1-2 q.91 a.l; rectius 1-2 q.93 a.1)
Et clarius idem beatus Thomas attingens hanc materiam xci.b dis. ar. ii. (1-2 q.91 a.2) in
parte preall. dicit quod, cum omnia, que divine providentie subduntur, a lege eterna regu-
lentur et mensurentur, manifestum est quod omnes participent aliqualiter legem eternam,
in quantum scilicet ex impressione eius habent inclinationes in proprios actus et fines.
Inter cetera autem, etiam rationalis creatura excellentior quodammodo divine providentie
subiacet, in quantum et ipsa sit providentie particeps sibi ipsi et aliis providens, unde et in
ipsa participatur ratio eterna, per quam homo naturalem habet inclinationem ad debitum
actum et finem, et talis participatio legis eterne in tali creatura lex naturalis dicitur secun-
dum eum, quod est bene notandum. Et sic videtur quod lex naturalis non sit proprie ius di-
vinum sed participatio legis eteme. Ad idem facit c. Quo iure viii. dist. (D.8 c. 1) ubi tex-
tus dicit quod ius divinum in divinis scripturis habetur, lex autem naturalis non continetur
in aliqua constitutione, ut patet ex precedenti et probatur infra ead. dist. lus naturale (D. I
c.7), ubi dicitur quod naturale ius non habetur constitutione aliqua, sed instinctu nature, id
est naturali inspiratione seu inclinatione."
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natural law was the necessity to do good and avoid evil. Guido de Baysio
had incorporated Thomas' text into his definition at the end of the thir-
teenth century but obscured Thomas' influence by attributing the text to
Laurentius Hispanus (t 1248). Panormitanus corrected him and changed
Thomas' text in a small but significant way. It was the first principle of
the law (lex) of nature to do good and avoid evil.5 8 When Panormitanus
reached Gratian's central text on natural law at D. 1 c.7, his terminology
began to become unstable. As we have seen when he wrote about natural
law drawing upon Thomas' Summa theologiae, he adopted Thomas' lex
naturalis consistently. When he began to discuss Isidore's text, however,
he began to vacillate in his terminology: 59
Note that there is only one lex naturalis for all people, and there-
fore all people have one natural instinct .... Note that lex natu-
ralis is stamped naturally on the hearts of people... Note the
nine examples of ius naturale that are placed here in the text. Do
not think that naturale is restricted to these examples or that lex
naturalis can be defined through them. Many other examples
might be given.
As he analyzed Isidore's list of examples of natural law, he reverted
completely to the language of the jurists:60
18 Ibid. fol. "Sed adverte quod ista dicta Archidyaconi que attribuit Laurentio sunt ad
literam beati Thome in prima secunde dis. xciv. articulo ii. ad aliud tamen effectum quam
queratur hic. Ibi enim beatus Thomas format questionem an lex naturalis contineat unum
preceptum an plura. Et tandem videtur concludere quod multa sunt legis nature precepta
in se ipsis, omnia tamen communicant in una radice, scilicet ad unum primum preceptum.
Primum autem preceptum legis nature est per eum quod bonum est faciendum et prose-
quendum et malum vitandum. Et super hoc fundantur omnia alia precepta legis nature, ut
scilicet omnia facienda vel vitanda pertineant ad precepta legis nature, que ratio practica
naturaliter apprehendit esse bona humana." Thomas had written in 1-2 q. 94 a. 2 co. "Hoc
est ergo primum praeceptum legis, quod bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et
malum vitandum. Et super hoc fundantur omnia alia praecepta legis naturae, ut scilicet
omnia ilia facienda vel vitanda pertineant ad praecepta legis naturae..."
59 Ibid. fol. 261 r: "Nota quod unica est lex naturalis omnibus hominibus, et sic omnes
habent unum instinctum naturale.... Nota quod lex naturalis est in cordibus hominum
naturaliter impressa.... Nota novem exempla iuris naturalis que ponuntur hic in textu.
Non enim intelligas quod naturale restringatur ad ista exempla, vel quod per ista lex natu-
ralis diffiniatur. Nam multa alia exempla poni possunt."
60 Ibid. "Et inter cetera exempla nota quod maris et femine coniunctio est de iure na-
turali, et in hoc notat glosa I (D. I c.7 s.v. coniunctio) in quantum dicit quod, si intelligatur
in hoc textu de coniunctione corporum, tunc debet intelligi de iure naturali ex sensualitate
proveniente; si autem de coniunctione animorum, tunc quasi ius naturale ex ratione prove-
niens."
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Among other examples note that the coupling of men and women
is a norm of ius naturale, as the gloss notes, in so far as he says
that, if this text is understood as the coupling of bodies then it
ought to be understood as being a norm of ius naturale deriving
from sensuality. If however, it is understood as a coupling of
souls, then the norm is just as ius naturale derived from reason.
Panormitanus used Thomas' terminology, mixed in with the jurists' ius
naturale, and did not seem to object to or perhaps even to have noticed
his unstable terminology for describing natural law.
Panormitanus' mixing of juristic and theological terminology was not
typical of the jurists-although theologians, as far as I can see, adopted
Thomas' lex naturalis by the early modem period.6 1 For example Fran-
cisco Sudrez (t 1617) used lex naturalis almost exclusively when writing
about natural law in his comprehensive treatise on law-except when he
turned to juristic thought.62 But Aquinas formed the bedrock of his dis-
cussion. Yet Sudrez was far from a positivist. In the debate about who
was and who was not an advocate of natural subjective rights most schol-
ars have agreed that Sudrez had a clear doctrine of rights.63
Manuel Gonzilez T6llez (t 1649) wrote one of the last extended
canonistic discussions of natural law that was framed by the medieval ju-
risprudential tradition in the preface to his commentary on the Decretals
of Gregory IX. 64 Like Panormitanus T6llez used and cited Thomas
61 In order to justify this generalization, the use of lex naturalis and ius naturale would
have to be examined in all the major jurists and theologians of the late medieval and early
modem periods-which is far beyond the scope of this essay.
62 The most convenient edition of his work is Francisco Sudirez, De legibus, 3 (II
1-12): De lege naturali, edd. L. Perefia, and V. Abril with E. Elorduy, C. Villanueva, and
P. Sufier et al. (Corpus hispanorum de pace 13; Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investiga-
ciones Cientificas-Istituto Francisco de Vitoria, 1974) and De legibus, 4 (H 13-20): De
iure gentium, edd. L. Perefia, E. Elorduy, V. Abril C. Villanueva and P. Sufier et al. (Corpus
hispanorum de pace 14; Madrid: 1973) and the other volumes in this series.
63 Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights, 301-315.
64 On T6llez, see Kenneth Pennington, "Sovereignty and Rights in Medieval and Early
Modem Jurisprudence: Law and Norms without a State," in Rethinking the State in the
Age of Globalisation: Catholic Thought and Contemporary Political Theory, ed. Heinz-
Gerhard Justenhoven and James Turner (Politik: Forschung und Wissenschaft, 10; Min-
ster: LIT Verlag, 2003) 117-141 at 126-136 and in Roman Law as Formative of Modern
Legal Systems: Studies in Honour of Wieslaw Litewski, ed. J. Sondel, J. Reszczyfiski, and
P. Sciglicki: 2 volumes (Krak6w: Jagiellonian University Press, 2003) 2.25-36.
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Aquinas extensively. 65 Only once, however, when discussing Thomas
and natural law, did he slip into Thomas' terminology.66 What is particu-
larly striking is that T6llez wrote about natural law primarily in terms of
"praecepta (precepts or maxims)" not in terms of "leges." The most fun-
damental of these norms, wrote T6llez, was that human beings should
and can distinguish between good and evil.67 For the remainder of these
norms he turned to the jurisprudential tradition. Human beings should
live honestly and should not injure their neighbors. 68 Lastly, to give each
person his ius in contracts, restitutions, and payments of debts, whose
rendering may be assigned to reason and natural equity.69 All of these
norms, T6llez concluded by turning back to Gratian's dictum at the be-
ginning of the Decretum, can be found in the divine wisdom of Christ's
admonition found in Matthew, chapter 7, "Do unto others as you would
others do unto you. 70
When Pope Benedict XVI addressed the participants of the Interna-
tional Congress on Natural Moral Law in Rome on February 12, 2007 he
talked about natural law: 7 1
65 Emanuelis Gonzalez T6llez, Commentaria in quinque libros decretalium 5 vols.
(Venice: Apud Haeredes Balleonios, 1766) 1.3-6.
66 Ibid. 3: "Priori modo natura rationalis fundamentum est legis naturalis; posteriori
vero modo est ipsa lex naturalis, quae humanae voluntati praecipit, vel prohibet, quod
agendum est, ut docent D. Thomas 1.2 q.94 art. 1 et 2."
67 Ibid. 5: "Primum et communissimum pracceptum est secundum eundem An-
gelicum Praeceptorem (Saint Thomas) . . . 'BONUM FACIENDUM' et per contrarium
'MALUM VITANDUM'."
68 Ibid. "Praecepta huius iuris a consultis indicata, non alia in effectu sunt quam quae
recensentur in 1. lustitia 10 § 1 ff. de iustitia et iure (Dig. 1.3.10.1), § Iurispraecepta Inst.
eodem titulo (Inst. 1. 1) ... Hosneste vivere continent decentiam naturalem erga se, tam
famae quam corporis intuitu... Alterum non laedere proximum, est iustitiae, quae est ad
alios; ergo contra naturalem rationem est alterum damno afficere uel in rebus per furtum
vel in vita aut persona per vulnus illatum . . . Unde deducit Florentinus nefas esse
hominum homini insidari."
69 Ibid. "Postremum est ius suum cuique tribuere, quod ad pactiones, restitutiones, et
solutiones rerum debitarum proprie spectat, quarum implementum merito rationi, et ae-
quitati naturali assignatur sive attribuitur."
70 Ibid. "Haec omnia praecepta respectu omnium hominum hoc uno clausit divina
sapientia Christi Domini apud Matth. 7: 'Omnia quaecumque vultis, ut faciunt vobis
homines, et vos facite illis. Haec est enim lex et propheta'."
7' The entire text reads: "La capacitA di vedere le leggi dell'essere materiale ci rende
incapaci di vedere ii messaggio etico contenuto nell'essere, messaggio chiamato dalla
tradizione lex naturalis, legge morale naturale... Proprio alla luce di queste constatazioni
che appare in tutta la sua urgenza la necessitI di riflettere sul tema della legge naturale e
di ritrovare la sua veritA comune a tutti gli uomini. Tale legge, a cui accenna anche
l'apostolo Paolo (cfr Rm 2,14-15), scritta nel cuore dell'uomo ed , di conseguenza,
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The capacity to see the laws of material being makes us inca-
pable of seeing the ethical message contained in being, a mes-
sage that tradition calls lex naturalis, natural moral law... From
it flow the other more particular principles that regulate ethical
justice on the rights and duties of everyone. So does the principle
of respect for human life from its conception to its natural end,
because this good of life is not man's property but the free gift of
God. Besides this is the duty to seek the truth as the necessary
presupposition of every authentic personal maturation. Another
fundamental application of the subject is freedom. Human free-
dom is always a freedom shared with others. It is clear that the
harmony of freedom can be found only in what is common to all:
the truth of the human being, the fundamental message of being
itself, exactly the lex naturalis. And how can we not mention, on
one hand, the demand of justice that manifests itself in giving
unicuique suum and, on the other, the expectation of solidarity
that nourishes in everyone, especially if they are poor, the hope
of the help of the more fortunate?
Unwittingly Benedict separated the two traditions that we have been ex-
amining. The jurists made no distinction between ius naturale and jus-
tice, and an important aspect ofjustice was preserving the common good.
anche oggi non semplicemente inaccessibile. Questa legge ha come suo primo e gene-
ralissimo principio quello di 'fare il bene ed evitare il male.'E, questa, una veritA la cui ev-
idenza si impone immediatamente a ciascuno. Da essa scaturiscono gli altri principi pii)
particolari, che regolano il giudizio etico sui diritti e sui doveri di ciascuno. Tale il prin-
cipio del rispetto per la vita umana dal suo concepimento fino al suo termine naturale, non
essendo questo bene della vita proprietA dell'uomo ma dono gratuito di Dio. Tale 6 pure it
dovere di cercare la veritei, presupposto necessario di ogni autentica maturazione della
persona. Altra fondamentale istanza del soggetto 6 la libertti. Tenendo conto, tuttavia, del
fatto che la libertA umana sempre una libertA condivisa con gli altri, chiaro che
l'armonia delle libert pu6 essere trovata solo in ci6 che comune a tutti: la veritA del-
l'essere umano, il messaggio fondamentale dell'essere stesso, la lex naturalis appunto. E
come non menzionare, da una parte, l'esigenza di giustizia che si manifesta nel dare
unicuique suum e, dall'altra, l'attesa di solidarieto che alimenta in ciascuno, specialmente
se disagiato, la speranza di un aiuto da pane di chi ha avuto una sorte migliore?" It can be
found on the Vatican website at:
http://212.77.1.245/newsservices/bulletin/news/ 19718.php?index= 19 7 1 8 &po-date=
12.02.2007&lang=it
The translation is based on:
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/benedict-xvi/speeches/2007/february/documents/hf-
ben-xvi-spe_20070212_pul-en.htm
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More significantly when Benedict thought about what constituted an ex-
ample of lex naturalis, he proposed an universal lex: the respect for
human life from conception to its natural end. Thomas Aquinas might
have found fault with this lex in the same way that he objected to gratu-
itous contracts being called general principles of natural law. Do not
human reason and human ideas of justice find ways to end lives between
conception and death, he might ask. The death penalty and the killing
fields of war are two examples that he would certainly have cited. As
Thomas pointed out, how can something be called a principle of natural
law if there are generally held exceptions to it?7 2
What Benedict overlooks is his Church's own jurisprudence. It is what
every jurist, even the pagan Roman jurists, had understood for centuries:
ius embodies justice; and ius naturale in its purest form contains equity,
justice, and reason in its DNA. I would argue that the shift in terminology
that we have traced has impoverished natural law thought. lus naturale
shifted the emphasis both yesterday and today from a set of precepts,
rights, and duties encapsulated in ius to positivistic sets of rules and
norms, shaped and fashioned according to each person's belief system,
that are and always have been the defining feature of lex. Human beings
may never agree on universal rules of a lex naturalis, but they might
agree on universal precepts of a ius naturale.
Finally, to answer the question that I posed at the beginning of this
essay: why were the bollards surrounding the Supreme Court provided
with the word "Lex"? The answer is undoubtedly "Ignorantia iuris."
72 Another example of how language can shape thought is Thomas Hobbes' attempt to
distinguish between ius naturale and lex naturalis: "The RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers
commonly call Jus Naturale, is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will
himselfe, for preservation of his own Nature... A LAW OF NATURE, (Lex Naturalis), is a
Precept, or general Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that
which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to
omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of
this subject, use to confound Jus and Lex, Right and Law; yet they ought to be distin-
guished; because RIGHT consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear; Whereas LAW deter-
mineth and bindeth to one of them: so that Law and Right differ as much as Obligation and
Liberty, which in one and the same matter are inconsistent." Thomas Hobbes,
(1588-1679), Leviathan (London-New York: Penguin, 1968) 189, Part 1, chapter 14.
